

## Matthew L. Kotzen, *curriculum vitae*

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CONTACT INFORMATION	Department of Philosophy UNC Chapel Hill Caldwell Hall 102B Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA	Cell: (919) 448-8920 Fax: (866) 383-2778 E-mail: kotzen@email.unc.edu Web: <a href="http://matthewkotzen.net">http://matthewkotzen.net</a>
ACADEMIC POSITIONS	<b>University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill</b> Bowman and Gordon Gray Distinguished Term Associate Professor Associate Professor (with tenure), Department of Philosophy Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy	July 2014–June 2019 July 2013–present July 2008–June 2013
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION	Epistemology, Formal Epistemology, Philosophy of Science	
AREAS OF COMPETENCE	Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Aesthetics	
EDUCATION	<b>New York University</b> Ph.D. in Philosophy	September 2008
	<b>Harvard University</b> A.B. <i>magna cum laude</i> in Philosophy	May 2000
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS	<b>Ruth and Phillip Hettleman Prize for Artistic and Scholarly Achievement</b> Prize for scholarly achievement awarded annually to UNC faculty members	2016
	<b>IAH Academic Excellence Award</b> \$3,000 to support research and teaching at UNC	2016
	<b>UNC Interdisciplinary Initiatives Grant</b> \$10,000 to support a conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches to Humor (co-organized with Michelle Robinson)	2015
	<b>Faculty Fellow</b> New York Institute of Philosophy Foundations of Epistemology Project	2011–2014
	<b>Junior Faculty Development Award</b> UNC Chapel Hill Office of the Provost	2010
	<b>Graduate Fellow and Project Coordinator</b> New York Institute of Philosophy Disagreement Project	2007–2008
	<b>Graduate Fellow</b> New York Institute of Philosophy Science and Religion Project	2006–2008
PUBLICATIONS	<b>What Follows from the Possibility of Boltzmann Brains?</b> Forthcoming in <i>Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science</i>	
	<b>Probability in Epistemology</b> Forthcoming in <i>The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy</i>	
	<b>The Normativity of Humor</b> <i>Philosophical Issues</i> (2015) 25(1): pp. 396–414.	
	<b>The Probabilistic Explanation of Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing</b> In Goldschmidt (ed.), <i>The Puzzle of Existence</i> (Routledge 2013)	
	<b>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</b> <i>Nôus</i> (2013) 47(1): pp. 154–80. Reprinted in Neta (ed.), <i>Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Epistemology Vol 3</i> (Routledge 2012) Selected for inclusion in <i>The Philosopher's Annual</i> 2013	

**Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments**

*British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (2012) 63(4): pp. 825–39.

**Silins’s Liberalism**

*Philosophical Studies* (2012) 159(1): pp. 61–68.

**Dragging and Confirming**

*The Philosophical Review* (2012) 121(1): pp. 55–93.

Selected for inclusion in *The Philosopher’s Annual* 2012

***In Defence of Objective Bayesianism*, by Jon Williamson**

*Mind* (2011) 120(480): pp. 1324–1330.

**Review of *Decision Theory and Rationality* by José Luis Bermúdez**

*Philosophical Books* (2010) 51(1): pp. 53–62.

PAPERS IN  
PREPARATION

**Lewis’s Argument Against Desire-as-Belief  
Where Should Displaced Credence Go?  
Some Worries about Probabilistic IBE  
Conditional Oughts and Simpson’s Paradox  
The Bayesian and Frequentist Approaches to Inference  
A Formal Account of Evidential Defeat**

DEPARTMENT  
SERVICE

**Associate Chair** 2014–present  
**Graduate Committee** 2014–present  
**Hiring Committee** 2008–2009, 2013–2014, 2014–2016 (Chair)  
**Admissions Committee** 2008–2014  
**Colloquium Committee** 2009–2010  
**Speakers Committee** 2013–2014 (Chair)

UNIVERSITY  
SERVICE

**Bowman and Gordon Grey Selection Committee** 2015–2016 (Chair)  
**Polyani Lectureship Selection Committee** 2015–2016

PRESENTATIONS  
AND  
COMMENTARIES

**Information Sensitivity in Epistemology and Decision Theory** March 2016  
Dartmouth College Department of Philosophy  
**Comments on Lee Elkin’s “Confirmation Theory with Imprecise Probabilities”** January 2016  
2016 Eastern APA  
**Information Sensitivity in Epistemology and Decision Theory** April 2015  
2015 Pacific APA  
**Misbehaving Conditionals** September 2014  
UNC Philosophy in Fifteen Minutes  
**Comments on Ittay Nissan’s “Contrastive explanations, Crystal Balls, and the Inadmissibility of Historical Information”** May 2014  
2014 UNC–Hebrew University Workshop in the Philosophy of Science  
**Comments on Branden Fitelson’s “Comparative Confidence”** May 2014  
Duke Fitelfest Symposium  
**Conditional Oughts** August 2013  
2013 Triangle Area Philosophy Symposium

<b>Conditional Oughts and Simpson's Paradox</b> 2013 Formal Epistemology Workshop	May 2013
<b>Comments on Mercier and Sperber's "Why Do Humans Reason?"</b> New York Institute of Philosophy Foundations of Epistemology Project	April 2013
<b>Simpson's Paradox and the Sure-Thing Principle</b> MIT Department of Linguistics and Philosophy	February 2013
<b>Belief-Formation Processes</b> University of St Andrews Arché Research Centre Workshop on the Causes of Belief	November 2012
<b>Fine-tuning Arguments for God and Multiple Universes</b> Virginia Commonwealth University Life Sciences and Religion Public Lecture (with Paul Davies)	August 2012
<b>Comments on Julia Staffel's "Should I Pretend I'm Perfect?"</b> 2012 Formal Epistemology Workshop	June 2012
<b>Comments on Leandro De Brasi's "Reliability, Responsibility and Anti-Individualism"</b> 3rd Annual KCL-UNC Conference	May 2012
<b>Defeating Disjunctions</b> 2011 Eastern Division APA Meeting Symposium in Epistemology	December 2011
<b>Motivating Dempster-Shafer Theory</b> Rutgers Recent Topics in Formal Epistemology Seminar	November 2011
<b>Modeling Epistemic Flow</b> University of Chicago Formal Philosophy Workshop	May 2011
<b>Comments on David Chalmers's "Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence"</b> 2010 Carolina Metaphysics Workshop	June 2010
<b>Philosophical Perspectives on the Origins of the Universe</b> UNC Program in the Humanities and Human Values	May 2010
<b>Does Evidence Flow?</b> UC Berkeley Recent Topics in Epistemology Seminar	May 2010
<b>Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments</b> Virginia Commonwealth University	February 2010
<b>Information Session on Statistical Inference</b> 2009 Eastern Division APA Meeting	December 2009
<b>Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments</b> 2009 Formal Epistemology Workshop	May 2009
<b>Comments on Jacob Ross's "Countable Additivity and the Sleeping Beauty Problem"</b> 2008 Formal Epistemology Workshop	May 2008
<b>Comments on Peter Kung's "Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation"</b> 2008 Pacific Division APA Meeting	March 2008
<b>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</b> University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill	February 2008
<b>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</b> University of Texas at Austin	January 2008

<b>Dragging and Confirming</b> Cornell University	January 2008
<b>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</b> University of Michigan at Ann Arbor	January 2008
<b>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</b> UCLA	January 2008
<b>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</b> University of Pittsburgh	January 2008
<b>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</b> Ohio State University	January 2008
<b>Dragging and Confirming</b> Florida State University	January 2008

TEACHING

**Graduate**

Philosophy 700: Protoseminar (with Ryan Preston-Roedder)	Spring 2011
Philosophy 700: Protoseminar (with Keith Simmons)	Spring 2010
Philosophy 735: Survey of Recent Epistemology	Fall 2010
Philosophy 735: The Nature of Epistemic Norms (with Ram Neta)	Fall 2009
Philosophy 765: Philosophy of Humor (with Ram Neta)	Spring 2013
Philosophy 994: Dissertation Research Seminar	Spring 2009, Fall 2009 Spring 2015, Spring 2016
Philosophy 850: Explanation (with Marc Lange)	Spring 2012

**Undergraduate**

Philosophy 55: First Year Seminar: Paradoxes	Fall 2008
Philosophy 101: Introduction to Philosophy	Spring 2009, Spring 2011 Spring 2014, Fall 2015
Philosophy 180: Philosophy of Comedy	Fall 2012, Fall 2013, Fall 2016
Philosophy 335: Epistemology	Spring 2010, Spring 2012
Philosophy 397: Colloquium for Majors	Fall 2013, Spring 2015

**Undergraduate-Graduate**

Philosophy 432: The Beginnings of Analytic Philosophy (with Alan Nelson)	Spring 2016
Philosophy 433: Introduction to Formal Epistemology	Spring 2014
Philosophy 455: Intermediate Logic	Fall 2014

ADVISING

**PhD**

Lindsay Brainard, Finnur Dellsén, Chris Dorst, Katrina Elliott, Emily Given, Tyron Goldschmidt, Christian Loew, Kate Nolfi, Amber Ross, Chris Smith

**MA**

Jessi Addison, Lindsay Brainard, Finnur Dellsén, Chris Dorst, Francesco Nappo, Kate Nolfi, John Phillips, Nate Sharadin, Larisa Svirksy

**Undergraduate**

Allison Balin, Jim Dennison, Priyesh Krishnan, Jonathan McCain, Christopher Register